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Neoplatonic Influence in the Writings   
of Robert Grosseteste  
 
 
       Robert Grosseteste was appointed the first chancellor of Oxford University in 
1221. He lectured in theology there from 1225 to 1230, and became the first reader 
to the Greyfriars or Franciscans in 1230. In 1235 he became the Bishop of Lincoln, 
which he remained until his death in 1253.1 He wrote several treatises which con-
tain Platonic and Neoplatonic influences, most notably De luce, on the metaphys-
ics of light; De lineis, angulis et figuris, on mathematical reasoning in the natural 
sciences; Hexaemeron, a commentary on Genesis; and Commentary on the Poste-
rior Analytics, all written between 1228 and 1235. The Neoplatonic influences 
probably come from Latin translations of Arabic commentaries on Aristotle, most 
notably the al-Madina al-Fadila, or Virtuous City, of Alfarabi; and the Shifa: De 
anima and Commentary on the Theology of Aristotle of Avicenna, or Ibn Sina. 
       Grosseteste’s first studies were probably at the cathedral school in Lincoln in 
the late 1180s, after which he was active at the cathedral school of Hereford in the 
1190s, which was a center for Arabic learning at the time. He then studied at Ox-
ford from around 1199 to 1209. Grosseteste is seen by some scholars as continuing 
the Neoplatonic views found in the Arabic commentaries on Aristotle, in particular 
those of Avicenna. The Neoplatonic content of Avicenna’s writings was intro-
duced to the Latin West by Dominicus Gundissalinus, who translated Avicenna’s 
De anima in the twelfth century, along with the Fons Vitae of Avicebron, or Ibn 
Gabirol, another source of Neoplatonic ideas. This essay will examine in particular 
concepts in the Enneads of Plotinus as they are related to concepts in Grosseteste’s 
writings, as they were filtered through these sources. This involves concepts of 
light and matter, perception, imagination, and intellection. 
 
 
Light and Matter 
 
       In De luce,2 considered the first scientific cosmology written since the Timae-
us, lux, or incorporeal light, emanates into separate forms or intelligibles, and 
                                                 
1 For biographical information see R. W. Southern (1986). 
2 C. C. Reidl (1942), 10–12. 
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multiplies itself infinitely from a single point through rarefaction and condensation 
as lumen. Light diffuses through straight lines, as in Enneads IV.6.1, into atomic 
particles, as in the Timaeus, from point to line to surface to solid. As in an emana-
tion from the One, the lux spiritualis becomes the prima forma substantialis, as 
described in the Fons Vitae of Avicebron. Matter is seen as deprivation in relation 
to higher forms, as in Enneads II.4.5. According to Plotinus, matter does not exist 
in Intellectual Principle. Matter exists in the partial thing, without form, which is in 
darkness. Darkness lies below light; light, which is Reason Principle itself, is visi-
ble to mind, in the same way that light and color are visible to the eye. Light and 
color are what give things form and existence, and the matter of things lies below 
light and color as being inaccessible to reason as it participates in an idea. Matter 
cannot be an object of intellection, in Enneads V.9.5, because ideas are only pro-
jected onto matter, and forms in matter can only be derivatives and traces of an 
original which is a product of intellection itself. 
       Matter is thus a recipient of the Form Ideas in intellection. The substratum of 
matter is indeterminate and shapeless, while everything in intellection is determi-
nate and has shape; thus matter cannot exist in the Intellectual Principle, or the 
intellectual. There is no necessity for matter in the intellectual, because there are 
no elements or compounds there, no shifting or derivatives, as in matter. Matter 
has no identity nor permanence, and is in constant flux. Because it is already eve-
rything in the intellectual, there is no possibility of flux or impermanence, as de-
scribed in II.4.3. The particulars of sensation are necessarily products of universals 
in intellection, and universals in reason are in turn derived from the particulars of 
reflected Form Ideas in sensation. 
       In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Grosseteste, lux is without 
dimensions but causes all spatial dimensions and change. As light emanates from 
the sun, vis emanates from virtus in bodies, and intelligibles are illuminated in the 
mind in the oculus interior. In the al-Madina al-Fadila of Alfarabi, active intellect 
is compared to the sun, and light imprints species in the material intellect. Active 
intellect transforms sense perceptions into principles, which are the first intelligi-
ble thoughts, as in Enneads I.3.5. In Enneads V.5.7, the intellectual is able to see a 
light which is not an external, corporeal light, or reflected light, as in lumen. The 
internal light is a lux, an incorporeal, undiffused or rarefacted light. The intelligi-
bles, which are themselves incorporeal, are illuminated by the lux. The intellectual 
is able to see both the intelligible and the light which illuminates the intelligible. 
The intellectual sees without seeing; it sees light itself, not as reflected off of bod-
ies, in a vision of an incorporeal reality. In Enneads VI.4.7, Plotinus describes the 
diffusion of light. A luminous mass is at the center of a transparent sphere, illumi-
nating the surface of the sphere. The illumination is not by any bodily magnitude 
or corporeal quality. Once the light is diffused, it occupies no specific location and 
can have no corporeal presence. The light is simultaneously present everywhere, 
like sunlight, the presence of which is uninterrupted by the bodies it illuminates. 
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       For Grosseteste in De luce, light is the first corporeal form, and the cause of 
all becoming of natural things. Light is corporeity itself, that which produces di-
mensions in matter, because material things only exist in that they are illuminated, 
either by lumen in the physical world, or by lux in the mind. Grosseteste attempts 
to explain the formation of the natural world by the auto-diffusion of light in math-
ematical and geometrical structures. Following Augustine, lux is seen as the inter-
mediary between spirit and matter, and is that which connects mind and body. 
Through lux, the mind is able to know the principia essendi, the intelligibles, as for 
Plotinus. As illuminated, the principia essendi become the principia conoscendi, 
the principles upon which reason is based. As principia essendi, intelligibles are 
ante rem, and as principia conoscendi they are in re as particulars derived from 
universals. The internal light of Plotinus is visible to the mind for Gosseteste by 
the eye of the mind, the oculus mentis, which corresponds to the interior eye in 
vision, which translates intelligibles to forms or species, as for Plotinus. 
       Grosseteste’s theory of light is influenced primarily by the account of light in 
Genesis, and the Hexaemeron of Basil. In the De luce of Grosseteste, as the first 
corporeal form, light is the closest thing in matter to the immaterial. The infinite 
multiplication of light as lux produces a finite quantity of matter as given by light 
as lumen, because lux itself is infinite. The multiplication and diffusion of light 
produces a sphere, as in Plotinus, and the closer to the surface of the sphere, the 
more rarefied is matter. The more the light is multiplied, the more corporeal bodies 
become. Light is diffused through nine celestial spheres and four sublunary 
spheres. In the process, the creative lux spiritualis becomes the uncreative reflect-
ed lumen, in the creation of both forms and intelligibles. 
       In the Hexaemeron of Grosseteste, light is the instrument by which bodily 
sensation occurs, and by which body interacts with mind. All judgments of beauty 
are made according to the principles of light, in its harmony and distribution. Light 
is the instrument by which the form or species apprehended by the particular sense, 
the species sensibilis, corresponds to the form apprehended in the common sense, 
sensus communis, as species apprehensibilis. Imagination is the process of making 
that correspondence. The species apprehensibilis is a phantasm which creates a 
corresponding form in memory, as a mnemic residue. Light is the instrument by 
which mind is connected to matter. 
       In his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Grosseteste compares the lux 
spiritualis that illuminates intelligible objects in the oculus mentis to the sun which 
illuminates the bodily eye and corporeal objects. The intelligible objects that are 
receptive to the lux spiritualis are made visible to the oculus interior. The more 
similar an object is to the lux, the more receptive it is to it, and the more it can be 
apprehended by mind, which also acts as a spiritual light, in an irradiatio spiritual-
is. The proximity to the lux spiritualis in both perceived object and operation of 
mind leads to greater clarity and certitude in thinking. The operation closest to the 
lux in mind is the “first visible” in interior sight, or visus interior, just as a colored 
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body is the first thing receptive of the light of the sun, though the actual first visi-
ble is the spiritual reflected light, the lumen spiritualis. 
       In the al-Madina al-Fadila of Alfarabi, the light of the sun is also compared to 
the illumination of the active intellect, which establishes the basic principles of 
thought, as in the mathematics and geometry of light of Grosseteste. According to 
Alfarabi, the light of the sun enters the eye and turns potential vision into actual 
vision, as potential thoughts in passive intellect are turned into actual thoughts in 
active intellect. The light of the sun then renders potential colors visible, then 
becomes visible itself, along with its source. The potentially intelligible thoughts 
in the material or passive intellect are “sense perceptions stored in the imaginative 
faculty” in al-Madina al-Fadila 200–203,3 which become intelligible through 
illumination, as in Enneads I.3.5 of Plotinus. 
 
 
Perception 
 
       In De lineis,4 the species, or eidos, incorporeal virtue or likeness of matter, is 
transmitted by light in perception, and is reflected and doubled, and dissipated, as 
in the imprint of Plotinus in Enneads I.1.7, IV.7.6, and V.3.2. According to Ploti-
nus, the light of reason forms principles, which are the Animate, and it is in the 
principle that sense perception is formed. Sense perception projects form and idea 
onto matter, rather than the reverse. Perception is not capable of an “immediate 
grasping of sensible objects” in I.1.7; it grasps rather the “impressions printed 
upon the Animate by sensation.”5 The Animate can be seen as the imagination, and 
objects can only be perceived once they have been filtered through a process of 
reason. The matter of objects is inaccessible to perception and reason, as it is in 
darkness and is not illuminated by the light of reason.  
       The impressions or imprints which are perceived are intelligibles, separate 
from matter. The perception of them is a form of sensation, which is a doubling or 
phantom of the act of sensation in reason itself. Perception in reason is of “Ideal 
Forms,” intelligibles prior to their association with forms in matter. All sense 
knowledge, discursive reason and intellection are the product of the perception in 
reason of Ideal Forms. Discursive reason, in V.3.2, involves the observing, judg-
ing, combining and distinguishing of the impressions of the Ideal Forms in the 
intellectual, that part of intellect inaccessible to reason, which appear as the repre-
sentations imprinted in sense perception. Some of the imprinted representations 
become mnemic residues, memory traces, which are absorbed and recollected, and 
combined with representations in conscious thought. 
                                                 
3 H. A. Davidson (1992), 51. 
4 B. S. Eastwood (1964). 
5 Plotinus (1991). 
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       In Enneads IV.7.6, Plotinus distinguishes between perception and what might 
be called apperception, or multiple perceptions. Actual perceptual experience is 
multiple and diversified, as for Grosseteste; perceived objects have no necessary 
connections in size or position, and can be perceived in a variety of ways by the 
different senses. But in human perception, in reason, all objects and acts of percep-
tion are unified to form a coherent whole which structures the world around us. In 
the Enneads, when the fragmented and variable objects of perception “reach the 
ruling principle they will become like partless thoughts…”; they are organized in a 
conceptual process through the mechanisms of language. Reason and knowledge 
depend on the materials of sense experience, but are not dictated by the objects or 
processes of sense perception.  
       The discerning of impressions printed upon the intellect by sensation for Plo-
tinus is the function of discursive reason, not immediate sense perception. Since 
the sensual impressions in perception are copies and derivatives of intelligible 
forms, perception itself is a copy and derivative of reason. Reason in Plotinus is 
composed of mnemic residues of perceived objects, what Plotinus calls “imprints” 
in “recollections” in Enneads V.3.2. Thoughts are propelled by the desire created 
by the multiple and fragmented images of perception as reconstructed in reason. 
“The reasoning power in soul makes its judgment, derived from the mental images 
present to it which come from sense-perception, but combining and dividing 
them…,” in dialectical and discursive reason, mathematics and geometry, and 
abstract concepts, in what Grosseteste will call the virtus scitiva and the virtus 
intellectiva. 
       In Enneads IV.7.6, sense perceptions merge together in reason like “lines 
coming together from the circumference of the circle,” from multiplicity to unity, 
subject to the ruling principles, the archetypal, genus and species: what will be for 
Grosseteste the intelligentia, divine intelligence; and what Grosseteste will call the 
principia essendi and the principia conoscendi. In reality, sense objects are varia-
ble and differentiated in terms of size and location; they are multiple and frag-
mented, and it is only the reason of the perceiver which allows them to be appre-
hended as whole and congruent. Sense objects themselves cannot be immediately 
perceived as a congruent whole. Once the diverse and multiple sense objects have 
been transformed into a whole by apprehension in sense perception, they cannot 
return to their original state, for Plotinus. Apprehension permanently transforms 
sensual reality in conformance with the principles of reason.  
       Perception, according to Plotinus, divides, multiplies, and otherwise organizes 
sensual reality; in other words, perception is an intellective process, the most basic 
exercises of which are mathematics and geometry. Perceived objects are divided 
and organized into parts which correspond directly to the organizational capacities 
of reason. The relation of parts and subdivisions to the whole and to infinity is the 
same in the sense object as it is in reasoning capacity. Geometry and mathematics 
are the mechanisms by which sensual reality is represented by perception to rea-
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son, though sense objects do not inherently contain geometrical and mathematical 
properties; those properties are applied to them, in the species apprehensibilis. 
       In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Grosseteste, universals  
(principia) exist in intellect potentially, and are activated to actuality, as in the De 
anima of Aristotle the potential, material intellect, intellectus passibilis, is activat-
ed by the intellectus agens towards the active, cosmic intellect. For Grosseteste, 
sense knowledge plays a role in the activation of the intellectus passibilis. In sense 
knowledge a particular object is apprehended in a particular space and time, not as 
the object itself but in the signification of the object as species, or eidos, as im-
printed on the faculty of sense perception. The individual species sensibilis is 
determined by its position in space and time, and is apprehended as an individual 
signified, a sign or species rather than the thing itself, while the corresponding 
species apprehensibilis, the form as understood, is not determined by a particular 
space and time, and is apprehended as a collective signified: “…sensus talis est 
quod ipse est apprehensivus rei alicuius signate et non est simul apprehensivus rei 
alterius, quia necesse est scire rem signatum in loco signato et tempore signato, 
quare non sentit nisi rem unam signatam” (I.18, 135–138).6  
       Sensible experience, as defined by space and time, which are intelligibles in 
the virtus intellectiva, not principia essendi of the material world, is pre-
determined by space and time as a priori principia. Space and time do not exist 
outside of thinking, intellectus; they are not qualities of the physical world, but 
they determine the object as it is perceived individually, according to Grosseteste, 
in sense experience, through the species apprehensibilis.  
       Sense perception is thus not the cause of knowledge, but rather is the condi-
tion by which knowledge is possible, as Grosseteste explains in the Commentary 
on the Posterior Analytics: “Similiter neque contingit scire sensibilia neque sensus 
est causa scientie, sed occasio…” (I.18, 133–134). Reason results from sense per-
ception because reason is the apprehension of the thing signified, the species ap-
prehensibilis in relation to the species sensibilis: “Huius autem ratio est quod sen-
sus talis est quod ipse est apprehensivus rei alicuius signate…” (I.18, 134–136). 
Reason, the virtus cogitativa or virtus scitiva, apprehends the signification or spe-
cies apprehensibilis still as a singular or individual, as it is connected with material 
things and determined by space and time, while the virtus intellectiva, as illumi-
nated by the lumen spiritualis, the reflected spiritual light, of intelligentia, appre-
hends the signification in its totality, as universal knowledge: “et non est simul 
apprehensivus rei alterius…” (I.18, 136), “cum sola demonstrabilia et universalia 
sciantur…” (I.18, 164–165). 
       That which perceives is not contingent with that which is perceived; what is 
perceived is the species sensibilis, the form of the object, not the object itself, as 
determined in its singularity by the preconditions of space and time, of which the 
                                                 
6 P. Rossi (1981). 
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perceiver is aware in virtus cogitativa, but unaware in virtus intellectiva, as intelli-
gentia is not wholly accessible: “…manifestum est quod non contingit sentire per 
sensum.” In that what is perceived is the species sensibilis and not the object itself, 
sense perception already consists of a process of abstraction, in the role of the 
species apprehensibilis. As the individual sense perception is determined by space 
and time, there is no possibility of immediate sense perception, or of an immediate 
knowledge of objects in the physical world outside of intellection. Sense percep-
tion is a spiritual operation rather than a physical operation, as Grosseteste says in 
the treatise De lineis, angulis et figuris: “In sensu enim ista virtus recepta facit 
operationem spiritualem quodammodo et nobiliorem.”7 
       The abstractions made by sense perception are primitive in nature, confused 
and relative. The species sensibilis in perception is corrupted, indeterminate, and in 
flux, while the species apprehensibilis in intellectus is integrated and clear, as an 
archetype or intelligible. In the Commentary on the Physics of Grosseteste (Summa 
Lincolniensis Physicorum): “Racio vero diiudicat integritatem atque veras prose-
quitur differencias, sed sensus invenit quedam proxima et confusa veritati, accipit 
vero racio integritatem. Racio…accipit vero a sensu confusam ac veri proximam 
similitudinem.”8 Sense perception receives reality as multiple, undifferentiated and 
incomplete, in what Plotinus saw as apperception, but the sensible object generates 
the singular image of it which is perceived, the species sensibilis. Sensation and 
intellection thus engage in a dialectical process involving the sense object and the 
perception of it, as in Plotinus. 
       In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, species sensibilis is apprehend-
ed without matter, as illuminated by intellectus; species apprehensibilis creates a 
likeness in understanding, as in Plotinus’ Enneads V.3.2, where “reasoning-
principle in the soul,” discursive thought, “acts upon the representations standing 
before it,” the species apprehensibilis, “as the result of sense perception,” the spe-
cies sensibilis. For Plotinus, discursive reason approaches nous when reason rec-
ognizes its recent sense impressions and “adapts them, so to speak, to those it holds 
from long before,” the mnemic residues or memory traces of previous sense im-
pressions, in a process of reminiscence. This is also described in the Hexaemeron 
of Grosseteste. The same process is described in the Theology of Aristotle, a para-
phrase of the Enneads. Ratio is seen by Grosseteste in the Commentary on the 
Posterior Analytics as a mirror reflecting the virtus intellectiva, as in Enneads I.1.8 
and I.4.10. In Enneads I.1.8, the soul “appears to be present in the bodies by the 
fact that it shines into them.” The principia conoscendi in intellect or soul become 
the principia essendi of the thing or living being “not by merging into body but by 
giving forth, without any change in itself, images or likenesses of itself like one 
face caught by many mirrors.”  
                                                 
7 L. Baur (1912), 60:25. 
8 R. C. Dales (1963), 4–5. 
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       Bodies and things in sense experience, as principia essendi, are mirror reflec-
tions of the principia conoscendi in intellect, as it is projected onto the sensible 
world through sense experience. Just as in Grosseteste’s theory of vision, which 
requires the combination of the intromission of light as reflected off of sensible 
objects, and the extramission of light as projected from intellect, so the existence of 
bodies and objects in the world requires a dialectic of their essential being and their 
definition as projected onto them by intellect. This dialectic can be found again in 
Plotinus. In Enneads I.4.10, ratio, or discursive reason, the lower part of the soul, 
“becomes like the reflection resting on the smooth and shining surface of a mirror.” 
The sense impression itself of the sensible body or object exists in intellect as a 
reflection of the principia conoscendi, formed in the virtus intellectiva. There can 
be no immediate sense perception of an object, without the mediation of the ab-
straction of the object in intellect, the formation of the species of the object, based 
on prior perceptions, in the process of intellection. 
 
 
Imagination 
 
       In his Hexaemeron (VIII, IV, 7),9 Grosseteste described imagination as a pro-
cess which combines the sense object, and the imprint of the species of the sense 
object in the senses, in intellection. The union of the species sensibilis and the 
species apprehensibilis is the union of the corporeal and incorporeal, and the first 
step in intellection from the passive intellect of sense peception, weighed down by 
the corporeal, to the active intellect of the virtus intellectiva, freed from the corpo-
real. The best example of the correspondence between species sensibilis and spe-
cies apprehensibilis is color, which is visible in the corporeal object and in the 
oculus mentis. Because in the act of perception the color in the sense object is not 
distinguished from the color in the oculus mentis, the “begetter and the begotten” 
are united, the color in the sense object and in the oculus mentis, and the perceiver 
is united with the sense object in the act of intellection in perception.  
       Through the corporeal experience of sense perception, the knowledge on the 
part of the anima rationalis of the phantasmata as mnemic residues in the imagi-
natio of the oculus mentis is clouded or forgotten, and the anima rationalis is not 
aware of the correspondence being made in intellection in the process of percep-
tion, and takes the sense perception to be immediate of the sensible object, as the 
anima rationalis is weighed down by its corporeity. In the Hexaemeron (VIII, IV, 
12), “Our memory, when it has received and retained a memory form [mnemic 
residue], is not always actually remembering,” as it is in a state of passive intellec-
tion, tied to its corporeity. But then “when it passes from not actually remembering 
to actually remembering,” that is, when it has been activated by an agent intellect 
                                                 
9 C. F. J. Martin (1996). 
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in the irradiatio spiritualis, “it begets and expresses from itself the actual intellec-
tion or understanding that is in every way like to itself,” in the activity of active 
intellect, virtus intellectiva. Through intellection, and the aspiration of the anima 
rationalis to see clearly the intelligentia through the irradiatio spiritualis in the 
oculus mentis, in the virtus intellectiva, the anima rationalis becomes aware of the 
species apprehensibilis in relation to the species sensibilis in the process of percep-
tion, and it becomes aware of the relation between human intellect and the sensible 
world. Intellect goes from being a functional intellect, in the gymnastics of discur-
sive reason in the virtus scitiva or virtus cogitativa, to being a creative and genera-
tive, productive intellect in the virtus intellectiva. 
       The aspectus mentis is the ability of the mind to grasp ideas through the per-
ception of visual forms, the ability of the oculus mentis to “see” the concept, the 
intelligible connected with the species apprehensibilis, which is related to the 
species sensibilis, in that the species sensibilis is always already a product of the 
species apprehensibilis in intellection in perception. The mind sees the intelligible 
in the irradiatio spiritualis of the intelligentia. Grosseteste explained in the Hexa-
emeron, “the species begotten in the fantasy [imaginatio] of the common sense,” 
the sensus communis, “begets of itself a species that is like it in the memory” 
(VIII, IV, 9), as a trace or mnemic residue, which corresponds to the presently 
perceived sensible object. Perception appears to be a learned process for Grosse-
teste, a product of the perceiver learning how to recognize objects and relation-
ships in relation to previously perceived objects and relationships, in order to pro-
cess them in perception. Then, in the Hexaemeron, “the species that can be appre-
hended by the reason, intellect or understanding” (VIII, IV, 10), the species appre-
hensibilis, projects its likeness (similitudo) in the virtus intellectiva in the process 
of perception, illuminated by the inner light, the irradiatio spiritualis, and the 
mind connects the begotten likeness with the form perceived, the species sensi-
bilis. As a result, “effective apprehension” is achieved. 
       In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (II.6), memory receives the 
species as integrated and synthesized in the sensus communis, and it receives the 
intentiones connected with the species, as detected by the vis aestimativa. Memo-
ria involves imaginatio or phantasia, the retention of the species sensibilis, and the 
memoria proprie dicta, the retention of the intentiones aestimatae, in the integra-
tion of the concept formed in the virtus intellectiva to produce the species appre-
hensibilis. Reason is stimulated to form concepts by the memory traces, which 
constitutes experience: “sed in rationabilibus iam contingit ex multis memoriis 
excitata ratione fieri experientiam…” (II.6, 35–37). Memory is created from sense 
experience, and universals in experience result from memory, but not as separated 
from particulars: “Ex sensu igitur fit memoria, ex memoria multiplicata experi-
mentum, ex experimento universale, quod est praeter particularia, non tamen sepa-
ratum a particularibus…” (II.6, 37–39). 
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       The intellectus abstracts the universal idea from sense knowledge and experi-
ence, both external and internal; universals do not exist separate from particulars 
or sense experience. While universals like the Platonic archetype are connected to 
the particulars of sense experience, they transcend them or go beyond them in a 
dialectical process in intellect, and they are the source of all particulars of sense 
experience as well, as intelligibles in virtus intellectiva. In the Commentary on the 
Celestial Hierarchy of Grosseteste, “Ponebant enim platonici rationes quasdam in 
mente divina, aeternas, per se subsistentes, divinas, intellectuales, ad quas dicebant 
omnia esse et fieri, quas et species et ideas vocabant, et tota et universalia, separa-
tas autem a creatis omnibus, et idea dicta universalia et tota…”.10 As in the One of 
Plotinus, all particulars in species and idea grow and become visible from the 
universality and totality of the transcendent whole. 
       The relation between the universal and particular is similar to the relation 
between lux, the source of light, and lumen, generated light. The universal is in the 
irradiatio spiritualis in the oculus mentis, in the illumination which is the source of 
the perception and cognition of particulars as phantasmata, illuminated by the 
lumen spiritualis. The unity of the universal exists in the multiplicity of particulars 
as the unity of lux exists in propagated light, in the Commentary on the Posterior 
Analytics: “universale non est figmentum solum, sed est aliquid unum in multis” 
(I.17, 121–122), and “puto quod unitas universalis in multis particularibus assimi-
latur unitati lucis in luce gignente et genita. Lux enim que est in sole gignit ex sua 
substantia lucem in aere, nec est aliquid novum creatum ut sit lux in aere, sed lux 
solis est multiplicata et propagata…” (I.17, 114–118). 
       The unity of the singular intelligence exists in the multiplicity of natural things 
in the universe. The universal intelligence exists in particulars as the quiddity or 
essential quality of particulars, through the means of the form discovered by Aris-
totle, so the ubiquity of the universal intelligence is the same as the existence of 
the intelligence in a particular place: “universalia rerum naturalium sunt minus 
entia quam singularia intelligentiarum” (I.17, 125–126), and “Si autem intelligi-
mus universalia per modum Aristotelis formas repertas in quidditate particularium, 
a quibus sunt res particulares id quod sunt, tunc universale esse ubique nihil aliud 
est quam universale esse in quolibet suorum singularium” (I.18, 144–147). The 
universal form or species, as the principia essendi, is in re as a particular, and ante 
rem and post rem as a universal. In intellection, the irradiatio spiritualis allows the 
intelligentia to exist as a quiddity or the principia essendi in the particulars of the 
principia conoscendi of sense experience and virtus scitiva and cogitativa. 
       Species, and genus, only exist in mind, as composed of particulars in virtus 
cogitativa or scitiva, and as abstracted as universals in virtus intellectiva. Univer-
sals are potential in reality, but only actual in mind. In apperception, the species is 
composed of particulars, as res inventa in multitudine, and is determined by the 
                                                 
10 J. McEvoy (1982), 342. 
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intelligibles of space and time, which precondition all particulars of sense percep-
tion. In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, “Universale autem, cum sit res 
inventa in multitudine, non est possibile sentire, quia quod reperitur in multis non 
est in tempore aut loco signato, quia si esset in loco et tempore signatis non esset 
idem inventum in omnibus, universale namque est semper et ubique” (I.18, 138–
142). The universal is not possible in perception, in sensible reality, because of the 
multiplicity of particulars. Because the universal is always and everywhere, and no 
particular place and time, that which is perceived in a signified place or time can-
not be a universal. At the same time, that which is perceived in multiplicity cannot 
be a particular signified place or time.  
       The universal concept in intellectus is derived from the memory traces of 
particulars in phantasia, but at the same time the particulars of the locations in 
space and time are only possible within the framework of the universal concept, 
which only exists in intellectus, as illuminated by intelligentia. The particulars of 
the multiplicity of apperception are always already conditions of the universal in 
intellect, and there is an impossibility of there being at any moment or in any way 
a particular element in sensible reality that is present in and of itself. As in the 
thought of Plotinus, for Grosseteste intellectus has complete access to neither sen-
sible reality nor the intelligibles of intelligentia, the two spheres of phenomena 
which form a dialectical process on which virtus cogitativa and virtus intellectiva 
are based, involving the corporeal and incorporeal. 
       The concept itself in intellectus is not subject to the change and variability of 
particulars in sense experience, as seen in the Commentary on the Posterior Ana-
lytics. The universal in concept is related to the particular in the process of induc-
tio, where the universal is derived from the particular, and the process of abstrac-
tio, through which the principia essendi of the particular are apprehended as sepa-
rate from its singularity. The principia essendi are the “unum et idem secundum 
iudicium suum in multis…” (I.14, 249–250), in the dialectic of the particular and 
universal, sense object and concept. The intentio animae takes the species appre-
hensibilis, as formed from the species sensibilis in intellectus, and balances it in a 
process of iudicium; the universal is derived from the particular. The iudicium of 
the intentio animae is necessary for both virtus scitiva and virtus intellectiva; sci-
ence cannot be based on the particulars of sense experience alone. 
       In the De anima (3.7.431b, 2), Aristotle wrote that the human intellect thinks 
the forms in the images, that the species sensibilis is given by the species appre-
hensibilis, in Grosseteste’s terms, which is formed in the imagination or phantasia 
and is presented to discursive reason in the process of perception. According to 
Avicenna, or Ibn Sina, in the Shifa: De anima (235),11 also known as the Metaphy-
isica, in the eleventh century, the image or species is formed in the sensus com-
munis, as for Grosseteste, and is then received by the imaginative faculty, the 
                                                 
11 H. A. Davidson (1992), 93. 
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phantasia, which combines the images in different configurations. Discursive 
reason then receives an “abstraction” of the species from the phantasia, a represen-
tation of the species apprehensibilis which corresponds to the species sensibilis.  
       The species apprehensibilis of Grosseteste is a similitudo of the species sen-
siblis, as a mnemic residue, and is thus a representation of the species sensibilis, 
which is itself a representation of the object to which its form corresponds. For 
Grosseteste in the Hexaemeron (VIII, IX, 11), the virtus of the retentive memory 
must be proportionate to the virtus intellectiva in order for the species apprehensi-
bilis to be formed. Memory is not always active (VIII, IX, 12), but when it is ac-
tive it produces a similitudo of intellection, as the ratio, the lower intellect, or 
discursive reason (as in the conscious process of memory) mirrors the virtus intel-
lectiva, the higher intellect, or nous (as in the unconscious process of memory), as 
Grosseteste described in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics.  
       In the Enneads of Plotinus, while perception grasps the “impressions printed 
upon the Animate by sensation” (I.1.7), through the mnemic residue, “nothing will 
prevent a perception from being a mental image for that which is going to remem-
ber it, and the memory and the retention of the object from belonging to the image-
making power” (IV.3.29), or the imagination (phantasia) of Grosseteste. In the 
representation in the mnemic residue, the species apprehensibilis, “what was seen 
is present in this when the perception is no longer there. If then the image of what 
is absent is already present in this, it is already remembering, even if the presence 
is only for a short time.” Through memory, “an image accompanies every intellec-
tual act,” as described in Enneads IV.3.30. Through the species apprehensibilis, 
“the intellectual act is without parts and has not, so to speak, come out into the 
open, but remains unobserved within…”. The species apprehensibilis functions as 
a kind of hieroglyph, communicating the elements of intellect which cannot be 
communicated by words, and are not accessible to discursive reason in language.  
       The function of language, or the extent to which language can function, is as 
the mirror reflection of the virtus intellectiva in ratio, or discursive reason, in the 
facilitation of memory. As Plotinus says, “the verbal expression unfolds its content 
and brings it out of the intellectual act into the image-making power, and so shows 
the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and per-
sistence and memory of it.” The mechanism of perception mediates between the 
sensible world of objects in nature and the inaccessible intellectual, or nous, in a 
dialectical process between the subject and the world. There must be an “affection 
which lies between the sensible and the intelligible” as Plotinus puts it, “a propor-
tional mean somehow linking the two extremes to each other” (IV.6.1), the species 
sensibilis and the species apprehensibilis. In the perception of an object, “we look 
there where it is and direct our gaze where the visible object is situated in a straight 
line from us…”. The object which is being perceived is already apprehended by 
the perceiving subject in relation to the perceiving mechanism, the construction of 
intellect involving the mnemic residue and the species apprehensibilis, through the 
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use of geometry, as vision is understood in relation to geometry and mathematics, 
the intelligible mechanisms as the underlying structure, as for Grosseteste. 
 
 
Intellection 
        
       In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Grosseteste, the intellectus or 
nous in mind abstracts universal ideas or principia from the particulars of sense to 
form principles, but intelligentia, divine or cosmic intelligence in human intellect, 
functions without a corporeal agent. Logic or ratio, Plotinus’ Reason Principle, is 
knowledge of the forms of material things. This is also described in the Hexaemer-
on, and commentaries on the Celestial Hierarchy and Mystical Theology of Pseu-
do-Dionysius which Grosseteste began in 1235.12 
       The same process is described in the distinction between active intellect and 
material intellect in the Theology of Aristotle, a paraphrase of the Enneads, based 
on Enneads I.3.5, V.1.3, V.9.4. Plotinus distinguishes between intellection, or 
nous, and dialectic, or between Intellectual Principle and Reason Principle, be-
tween the intellectual and discursive reason, or dianoia. Intellection can be seen as 
active intellect, being beyond the individual mind, and continuous and impassible, 
that is, not connected to sensation, while dialectic can be seen as material intellect, 
being connected to forms in matter, sensation, and individual thought processes. 
While this analogy can be made, Henry Blumenthal warns against actually equat-
ing nous and dianoia with the active and passive intellects of Aristotle.13 For Al-
farabi and Avicenna, active intellect is a second intelligence; for Grosseteste, it is 
divine and angelic; for Thomas Aquinas, it is an agent within human thinking. 
       Intellection “furnishes standards” for dialectic in Enneads I.3.5, providing the 
models by which dialectic operates. This idea perhaps originated with Aristotle in 
the Posterior Analytics, 2.19.100b, 12, where intellect or nous is identified as the 
source of the principles of thought. The term “nous” can be applied to Plotinus’ 
concept of intuitive intellect or the intellectual, and it can also be applied to the 
concept of an active intellect in the Arabic tradition leading to Alfarabi. Through 
its combining and dividing, dialectic aspires to intellection, but can only mimic it 
in a degraded form as connected to sensation. In Enneads V.1.3, discursive reason 
or material intellect can only be a secondary image of Intellectual Principle.  
       Discursive reason, or Reason Principle, is reason as enunciated or spoken, and 
perceived by itself, which in Plotinus is required for perception. The intellectual, 
on the other hand, is not spoken or perceived; it is unconscious reason, as it were. 
The “uttered reasoning” is the logos prophorikos, while the “reason stored within” 
is the logos endiathetos, in the Stoic distinction. Discursive reason is a form and 
                                                 
12 J. McEvoy (2003). 
13 H. J. Blumenthal (1990), 314. 
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derivative of intellection, and can only operate in its knowledge of the intellectual, 
but it is limited by its connection to sensation. Reason in sensation for Plotinus 
would be impossible without a consciousness of reason without sensation. The 
intellectual being prior to reason, it is more powerful, as described in Enneads 
V.9.4. The intellectual produces reason, and not vice versa, as it also produces 
sensation and perception. Reason is weaker because it is also passible, being con-
nected to sensation, and is therefore ephemeral and subject to decay, not to men-
tion being subject to error and misunderstanding.  
       Ratio is seen by Grosseteste in the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics as 
a mirror reflecting the virtus intellectiva, as in Enneads I.1.8 and I.4.10. For Ploti-
nus in I.1.8, intellect shines into matter and becomes present in it, as it does in 
reason. Bodies in matter become living beings, but intellect does not participate in 
matter or adapt to it in any way, nor is it affected by matter in any way, nor by the 
operations of reason; it is only present in matter in “images or likenesses of itself 
like one face caught by many mirrors.” Perception is limited and governed by the 
mechanisms of intellection in reason; the perceived world conforms to what is 
determined in thought. Material images are only reflections, as in Plato. The con-
centrated, impassible oneness of the intellectual is “unrolled and separate” in rea-
son, and reason is “present to bodies in division,” in multiple reflections of a sin-
gular source. If reason is operating well, in Enneads I.4.10, then the mirror reflec-
tion in it of intellect is clear. If the mirror in reason is “out of gear,” that which 
produces the reflection still exists, actively and unceasingly, as in active intellect, 
it is just not properly reflected in the lower part of the mind. A clear reflection of 
the intellectual in reason and sensation requires a state of peace and equilibrium in 
mind, and it is in that state that reason becomes most like intellection, as for 
Grosseteste in beatitude, in the cleansing of the lens of the oculus mentis. 
       In the Shifa: De anima of Avicenna, forms emanate from active intellect as 
differentiated in material intellect; intelligibles are differentiated in the composi-
tive imaginative faculty, as in Enneads IV.3.29 and IV.3.30. According to Ploti-
nus, “every mental act is accompanied by an image,” species sensibilis, and the 
mental act or thought is retained as a perceived mnemic residue in the imagination, 
which allows for memory. The retention of the mnemic residue is not possible 
without a conjunction between the word in the dialectic and an image, as in 
IV.3.30 “memory would be the reception, into the image-making faculty, of the 
verbal formula which accompanies the mental conception…,” what would be the 
species apprehensibilis. The conjunction is in the intellectual, as it “never rises to 
the exterior of the consciousness…”. The perceived image which is retained in the 
imagination is the product of the conception of the image as Ideal Form reflected 
onto matter, the conflation of species sensibilis and species apprehensibilis, but is 
perceived by reason only as image, or representation. 
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Conclusion 
  
       From this brief discussion, it can be seen that the philosophies of intellect and 
vision of Grosseteste owe much to the Neoplatonic conceptions of Plotinus in the 
Enneads, as filtered through works such as the Theology of Aristotle, Liber de 
Causis, or the al-Madina al-Fadila of Alfarabi and the Shifa: De anima of Avi-
cenna. It can also be seen that Grosseteste combines the Neoplatonic concepts with 
Christian concepts from Augustine or Basil, Aristotelian and Arabic concepts, and 
mystical concepts, from Pseudo-Dionysius, for example, to form a new and origi-
nal philosophy, the influence of which can be seen in Renaissance Neoplatonism, 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century Idealism, and in philosophies of cognition and 
vision in the twentieth century. 
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